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Contributory or Comparative: Which is the
Optimal Negligence Rule?
CHRISTOPHER J. ROBINETrE.
PAUL G. SHERLAND**

lmost immediately after negligence emerged as a distinct tort in the
early nineteenth century, the defense of contributory negligence
began to develop in conjunction with it.' The contributory
negligence rule is that when a plaintiff's negligence contributes to the
occurrence of an accident, the plaintiff cannot recover damages from a
defendant who negligently injures him. 2 Thus, even a slightly negligent
plaintiff could not recover from a negligent defendant if the plaintiff's
negligence proximately caused his own injury.
The contributory
negligence rule originated in the English case of Butterfield v. Forresterand was eventually adopted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
Over time, each of these jurisdictions created exceptions to the
contributory negligence rule.4 The three most significant were the safety
statute exception, the greater-degree-of-blame exception and the last clear
chance doctrine.5 The safety statute exception provided that a plaintiff's
contributory negligence did not bar his recovery if the defendant's
negligence consisted of the breach of a statute specifically designed to
protect a class of persons unable to protect themselves against defendant's
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I.
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORM AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 137 (1997).
2.

3.
4.

VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 5 (3d ed. 1994).

103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 6 (citing Fleming James, Jr., Contributory

Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Thomas F. Lambert, The Common Law is Never
Finished (Comparative Negligence on the March), 32 ATLA L.J. 741 (1968); Robert A.
Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, I ARK. L. REV. I (1946);
Charles L. B. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674 (1934)).
5.
ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 139-40; SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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negligence. 6 The greater-degree-of-blame exception provided that a
plaintiffs contributory negligence did not bar his recovery if the
defendant's conduct was "intentional" or "reckless". 7 The doctrine of last
clear chance provided that a plaintiff's contributory negligence did not bar
his recovery if the negligent defendant had the last clear chance to avoid
harming the plaintiff. 8
It is significant to note that the three exceptions described above each
allowed the plaintiff to recover his entire damages. The exceptions did not
invoke the concept of apportioning damages, as does comparative
negligence. 9 However, two of the exceptions directly or indirectly required
comparing the faults of the parties. For instance, was the defendant more at
fault than the plaintiff by being "reckless"? Or was the defendant's
opportunity to avoid injuring the plaintiff "clear", implying that the
defendant was more at fault? Once it was conceded that a comparison of
faults is being conducted, the doctrine of comparative negligence was a
logical consequence. In effect, the three exceptions to the contributory
negligence rule were transition doctrines. These doctrines ameliorated the
harsh results of contributory negligence until comparative negligence was
enacted. 0
Under comparative negligence, the contributing negligence of the
plaintiff does not necessarily bar recovery. Instead, the plaintiff's recovery
is reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him.'
In the United States, comparative negligence first took root in the state of
Georgia. In the 1860s, the Georgia legislature adopted two statutes, based
in part on language from cases decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia,
which made minor modifications to the contributory negligence rule. The
first statute provided for diminution of damages if a plaintiff was injured by
negligent railroad operations. 2 The second statute provided that a
defendant was not relieved from liability in negligence cases if the

6.

ABRAHAM,

supra note I, at 139. For examples of courts applying the safety

statute exception, see Koenig v. PatrickConstr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948);
Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1959).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 6 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON,
7.
THE LAW OF TORTS §65 at 462 (5th ed. 1984); Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84
N.W.2d 840 (1957); Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Ore. 34, 293 P.2d 717 (1956); 2
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.6 (1956)).

8.
ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 140. The last clear chance doctrine appears to have
originated in an English case, Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 547, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex.
1842).

9.
10.
11.
12.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 6.
See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 140-43.
Id. at 144.
1863 Ga. Laws 2979 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §46-8-291(1992)).
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3
plaintiff's negligence may in some way have contributed to the injury.'
The Supreme Court of Georgia used these two statutes to evolve a general
comparative negligence system for the state.14
The first significant instance of comparative negligence legislation
enacted in the United States was the second Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA)' 5 of 1908. The Act, which is still the law today, provides that
an employee of an interstate railroad carrier would not be totally barred by
his own negligence from an action against his employer. Instead, the jury
would reduce the employee's damages in proportion to the percentage of
his own negligence. During the next sixty years, only a few states followed
the lead of Georgia and FELA by adopting some form of a comparative
negligence statute: Mississippi in 191016, Nebraska in 1913 17, Wisconsin in
1931 18, South Dakota in 194119, Arkansas in 195520 and Maine in 196521.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, prodded by criticisms of the fault
system, many jurisdictions adopted comparative negligence.22 Currently
forty-six jurisdictions apply comparative negligence. However, they have
not adopted a uniform comparative negligence doctrine. Comparative
negligence systems can be classified as pure or modified.2 3 Under pure
comparative negligence, a plaintiffs negligence will never bar his
recovery. The plaintiff will recover some portion of damages even if he is
more negligent than the defendant. Under modified comparative
negligence, the plaintiff will not recover any compensation if he is more
negligent than (and, in some cases, as negligent as) the defendant.

13.

1863 Ga. Laws 2914 (current version at Ga. Code Ann. §51-11-7(2000)).

14.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 14. See generally L.P. Goodrich, Origin of the
Georgia Rule of Comparative Negligence and Apportionment of Damages, REP. PROC.

FIFTY-SEVENTH ANN. GA. B. Ass'n., May 23-24-25, 1940, at 174(detailing the history of
comparative negligence in Georgia).
15.
Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, §3, 35 Stat. 66(codified at 45 U.S.C.
§53(2000)).
16.
1910 Miss. Laws 135 (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. §11-7-15(1972)).
17.

1913 Neb. Laws 124, § I (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. §25-21, 185

(1995)).
18.
1931 Wis. Laws 242(current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. §895.045 (West
1997)).
19.
1941 S.D. Laws 160(current version at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 32-03.2-02
(Michie 1996)).
20.
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§27-1730.1 to .2 (1955),repealed and replaced by 1975 Ark.
Acts 367 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§27-1763 to 1765(1975), current version at ARK.
CODE ANN. §16-64-122 (Michie Supp. 2003)).
21.

22.
23.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §156(West 1964).

SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 2-3.
ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 145.
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An example will clarify the distinction. Assume there are two
automobile collisions in which a plaintiff suffers $100,000 of damage. In
the first collision, the plaintiff is 40% at fault and in the second collision
the plaintiff is 60% at fault. The first collision would be resolved the same
way in a pure or modified comparative negligence jurisdiction. The
plaintiff would receive $60,000-the amount of his damages minus the
percentage of his fault. The second collision would be resolved differently
depending upon which system of comparative negligence was in effect. In
a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff would recover
$40,000-the amount of his damages minus the percentage of his fault.
However, in a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff
would recover nothing because his fault exceeded that of the defendant.
The jurisdictions adopting modified comparative negligence have
developed three different forms thereof. The "slight" negligence rule
allows a plaintiff to recover if the plaintiffs negligence is slight compared
with that of the defendant. Only South Dakota uses this form of modified
comparative negligence.24 All the other modified comparative negligence
jurisdictions have adopted either the 50% rule or the 49% rule, depending
upon the language in the applicable statute or case. If a jurisdiction's
operative language allows comparative negligence as long as the plaintiffs
negligence is "not greater than" the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff
can be up to 50% negligent and still recover damages. However, if a
jurisdiction's operative language only allows comparative negligence as
long as the plaintiffs negligence is "not as great as" the defendant's
negligence, the plaintiff can only be up to 49% negligent in order to
recover damages. This seemingly small difference can have tremendous
consequences. Probably the most common jury finding of negligence in
jurisdictions applying
comparative negligence is the finding that each party
25
was 50% negligent.
In 1995, Michigan enacted a hybrid comparative negligence statute
combining elements of pure and modified comparative negligence. The
statute provides that if the plaintiff is more than 50% at fault, he receives
only an apportioned share of economic damages and nothing for
intangibles such as pain and suffering. 6
Thus, there are currently six different forms of the contributory or
The
comparative negligence rule in effect in the United States.
contributory negligence rule is still followed in the District of Columbia

24.

25.
26.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 14 -15.
ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 145.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §600.2959 (West 2000).
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and four states.27 Pure comparative negligence is the law in eleven
jurisdictions. 28 The "slight" comparative negligence rule is the law in
South Dakota. The 49% rule is the law in thirteen jurisdictions. 29 The 50%
rule is the law in twenty jurisdictions.
Michigan has adopted a hybrid
statute combining elements of pure and modified comparative negligence.
Jurisdictions in the United States have adopted a wide array of rules
regarding contributory and comparative negligence.
However, as a
normative matter, which rule is best? To answer this question, it is
necessary to examine the purposes of tort law itself. What, exactly, is tort

27.
See Felton v. Wagner, 512 A.2d 291 (D.C. 1986); Ridgeway v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 723 So.2d 600 (Ala. 1998); Billmeyer v. State, for Use of Whiteman, 64 A.2d 755 (Md.
1949); Parchment v. Garner,520 S.E.2d 100 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Litchford v. Hancock,
352 S.E.2d 335 (Va. 1987).
28.
See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.040 to 09.17.900 (Michie 2002); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1431.2 (West Supp.); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. §11-715 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§537.765, 537.068 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I
(Michie 1978); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§1411 to 1413(McKinney 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§9-20-4,
9-20-4.1 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§4.22.005 to 4.22.020 (West 1998). See also
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226
(Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d
I1 (Mo. 1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981).
29.
See Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§12-2501 to 12-2509 (2003)); Arkansas
(ARK. CODE ANN. §16-64-122 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT.
§§13-21-111 to 13-21-111.7 (1987)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §46-8-291 (1992), GA.
CODE. ANN. §§51-11-7, 51-12-31 to 33 (2003)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §6-801 to 6-806
(2003)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§60-258a, 60-258b (2003)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT.
ANN., tit. 14, §156 (2003)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. Modified comparative §§25-21,
185.07 to negligence 25-21, 185.12 (2003)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE, §32-03.2-02
(2003)); Tennessee (McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992)); Utah (UTAH
CODE ANN. §§78-27-37 to 78-27-43 (2003)); West Virginia (Bradley v. Appalachian Power
Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979)).
30.
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §52-572h (2003)); Delaware (DEL.
CODE ANN., tit. 10, §8132 (2003)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§663-10.9 and 663-31
(2003)); Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1 and 5/2-1116 (2003)); Indiana
(IND. CODE, §§34-51-2-5 to 34-51-2-6); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN, §§668.1 to 668.10);
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 231, §85 (2003)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN., §§604.01, 604.02 (2003)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN., §§27-1-702, 27-1-703
(2002)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §41.141 (2003)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN., §507:7-d (2003)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN., §§2A:15-5.1 to 2A: 15-5.3 (2003));
Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN., §2315.19 (2003)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23,
§§12 to 14 (2002)); Oregon (ORE. REV. STAT., §§18.470 to 18.510 (2001)); Pennsylvania
(PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 42, §7102 (2003)); South Carolina (Nelson v. ConcreteSupply Co., 399
S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991)); Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§33.001, 33.002,
33.003, 33.011, 33.012 and 33.013 (2003)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1036
(2003)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN., §895.045 (2003)); Wyoming (WYo. STAT., §§]-l109 (2003)).
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law attempting to accomplish and which rule, contributory or some form of
comparative negligence, would best help tort law achieve those goals?
I. RATIONALES FOR THE TORT SYSTEM

The three principal rationales for tort law are deterrence,
compensation and corrective justice. 31 Deterrence and compensation are
utilitarian justifications. A utilitarian justification focuses on how tort law
can be used as a tool to further an independent social or public policy goal.
Corrective justice focuses on the vindication of individual moral rights.
Corrective justice is not based on effects or consequences, as are deterrence
and compensation; instead, corrective justice is32 based on the idea that an
act or a framework is right or wrong "in itself'.
According to the deterrence rationale, tort law is designed to prevent
accidents by threatening potential wrongdoers with civil liability or the
inability to recover damages. Thus, for example, a potential wrongdoer
will drive more safely because the potential wrongdoer wants to avoid
paying money for harm he might otherwise cause. Deterrence proponents
seek to ensure that liability rules and associated defenses, such as
contributory or comparative negligence, induce both efficient levels of care
and efficient levels of activity. 33 For purposes of this article, the issue is
whether contributory negligence or some form of comparative negligence
is more successful in achieving tort law's deterrence rationale of preventing

accidents.
According to the compensation rationale, tort law is designed to
compensate victims of tortious injury. Proponents of the compensation
rationale often view tort law as a form of insurance. They argue that
"accident costs should be borne collectively, not individually, and that the
tort system should be evaluated in terms of its capacity to spread risk and
provide meaningful, expeditious, and low-cost compensation or insurance
to the victims of these activities".34 For purposes of this article, the issue is
whether contributory negligence or some form of comparative negligence

31.

DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW

5-10 (1996)

(describing deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice as "the three major normative
perspectives on tort law"). See also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 24-28, 44

(1970).

32.
The distinction between utilitarianism and individual moral rights, or
Kantianism, is familiar from the subject of Ethics. See JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY chs. 7- 10 passim (1986).
33.
DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3 1, at 5.
34.
Id. at 6.
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is more successful in achieving tort law's compensation rationale of
compensating victims of accidents.
According to the corrective justice rationale, the tort system is not
designed to deter accidents or compensate victims whose misfortune was
not caused by the morally culpable conduct of another moral agent. As
opposed to the utilitarian, forward-looking deterrence and compensation
rationales, corrective justice focuses on the past and the moral obligation of
the tortfeasor to rectify the injury to his victim. In other words, proponents
of corrective justice argue that the law obliges "a person whose morally
culpable behavior has violated another's autonomy to restore the latter as
nearly as possible to his or her pre-injury status., 35 For purposes of this
article, the issue is whether contributory negligence or some form of
comparative negligence is more successful in achieving tort law's
corrective justice rationale.
Scholars have debated which of these rationales undergird tort law for
decades.36 In fact, philosophical scholars have been debating the relative
merits of utilitarian versus Kantian ethical systems for centuries.37 Those
issues are beyond the scope of this article. We make no attempt to
determine which of the three rationales is most essential to tort law. For
purposes of this article, we decline to offer an opinion on the three
rationales' relative merits. Our goal, assuming each of the rationales is
legitimate, is simply to determine whether contributory or some form of
comparative negligence would best achieve each of tort law's rationales. It
will become apparent why we need not decide among the rationales.

II.

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

We will begin our analysis by evaluating whether contributory or
some form of comparative negligence best achieves corrective justice.
Comparative negligence is superior to contributory negligence in
achieving tort law's corrective justice rationale. The essence of corrective
justice is that a party who wrongs (injures) another must correct the wrong

35.
Id. at 8.
36. - See, e.g., id. at 5-10; PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY (1997);
Jeffrey O'Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury
Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gar.y Schwartz and Patrick Ath'ah, 32
CONN. L. REV. 137 (1999); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997).
37. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(1785); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863).
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to restore the moral balance between them.38 In tort law, when a tortfeasor
causes an injury, he cannot literally correct his wrong in the sense of
healing the injury; liability is therefore imposed for compensation although
it is only a substitute for the prior bodily health and autonomy. 39 However,
under a contributory negligence rule, tortfeasors may be relieved of the
burden of correcting their wrongs. If the victim's negligence contributes in
any way to the victim's injury, the tortfeasor does not have to correct his
wrong. In this scenario, the injured victim must pay the price of his own
negligence in the form of the injuries sustained. On the other hand, the
tortfeasor is not made to pay the price for his negligence. This leaves in
place a moral imbalance and violates corrective justice. The violation is
especially problematic in cases where the victim's negligence is slight in
comparison with the tortfeasor's wrong.
Corrective justice has often been discussed in terms of "fairness. 4 °
The late Professor Gary T. Schwartz weighed the relative merits of
comparative and contributory negligence based on "fairness" over two
decades ago and arrived at the same conclusion:
If this idea of fairness thus calls on tort law to take account
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence in ascertaining
the liability of a negligent defendant, the question arises of
what appropriate form the legal doctrine should assume.
As presented, the fairness idea is entirely satisfied by a
liability-dividing rule like comparative negligence. Should
the idea be carried further, however, so as to disqualify the
foolish plaintiff from receiving any recovery from a
negligent defendant? The contributory negligence idea
does not seem to be one of those that presses itself to its
logical extremes; when stated as above, in a moderate
form, the idea is both intelligible and stable. There is
nothing in its logic that would be impaired or compromised
were it deployed in support of a liability-reducing rule
rather than a liability-denying rule. Moreover, as we have
seen, the rule of negligence liability itself has a satisfactory
moral basis, one that is based on our disapproval of

38.
ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 14. Corrective justice is reflected in the common
sense phrase, "if you break it, fix it".
39.
Id.; Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV.
449, 498 (1992).
40.
See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 3 1, at 24 n. 1; Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory
and ComparativeNegligence: A Reappraisal,87 YALE L.J. 697, 722 (1978).
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antisocial or egotistical conduct. To negate altogether a
plaintiffs lawsuit against a negligent defendant would be
to allow the fairness idea associated with the contributory
negligence defense to extinguish
the moral idea that
4
predicates negligence liability. '
In contrast to contributory negligence, comparative negligence does
not relieve a tortfeasor of the burden of correcting his wrong. The
tortfeasor's negligence is weighed against the victim's negligence and the
tortfeasor must pay the victim for the tortfeasor's negligence. Thus, under
a comparative negligence regime, a tortfeasor must correct his wrong.
Professor Stephen R. Perry of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School endorsed a two-step model for corrective justice.4 2 In the first step,
all parties with a normatively significant connection to a tortious injury are
tied to a rectification procedure.4 3 It is Perry's second step that is relevant
for our purposes. Among the parties tied to the rectification procedure,
how should the loss be allocated?
[A]mong those persons who have a normatively significant
connection with a given loss, it is morally preferable that it
be borne by whoever acted faultily in producing it. If no
one was at fault, then for reasons already considered the
loss remains with the person who suffered the injury. If
more than one person was at fault-the victim might be one
of these-then the loss is proportionally shared among
them. 44
Thus, in designing his theory of corrective justice, Perry explicitly
describes, and endorses, comparative negligence.
Comparative negligence is superior to contributory negligence in
achieving tort law's corrective justice rationale because the contributory
negligence rule allows a tortfeasor to escape the burden of correcting his

41.

Schwartz, supra note 40, at 725. See also ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 148
("In my view the appeal of comparative negligence to the ordinary
individual's sense of fairness is sufficiently great to render this factor
alone virtually dispositive on the issue. The contributory negligence
rule that completely barred recovery from a negligent injurer because
the victim was also negligent, without regard to the degree of that
negligence, is highly objectionable to most people's sense of fairness.").
42.
See Perry, supra note 39.
43.
Id. at 489-99.
44.
Id. at 499.
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wrong. The comparative negligence rule forces the tortfeasor to correct his
wrong in the sense that he must compensate the victim for his share of
negligence. Similarly, a victim must pay for his share of his own
negligence.
Pure comparative negligence is superior to modified comparative
negligence in achieving tort law's corrective justice rationale for the same
reason comparative negligence is superior to contributory negligence.
Recall the essence of corrective justice is that a party who wrongs (injures)
another must correct the wrong to restore the moral balance between them.
Pursuant to modified comparative negligence, tortfeasors may be relieved
of the burden of correcting their wrongs. If a tortfeasor is less negligent
than the plaintiff (or even equally negligent in 49% of jurisdictions), the
tortfeasor does not have to correct his wrong. Thus, modified comparative
negligence can leave in place a moral imbalance. The imbalances will not
be as serious as those permitted under a contributory negligence rule.
However, a pure comparative negligence regime is superior in that it
requires a tortfeasor to correct every wrong.
Professor Schwartz, again using "fairness" language, raises another
issue. Modified comparative negligence, by using what Schwartz calls a
"break-point," treats similarly situated litigants in a very different manner:
one becomes very uncomfortable with the fairness
implications of [the] "break-point" feature-the feature that
allows the entire liability to turn on a slight difference in
the assessed negligence of the parties. To distinguish in an
all-or-nothing way between the party, whether plaintiff or
defendant, who is deemed forty-five percent negligent and
the party who is deemed fifty-five percent negligent is
substantially unfair-especially
when the relevant
judgments are imprecisely and unpredictably rendered after
the event by an ad hoc lay jury.45
Thus, pure comparative negligence is preferable to modified
comparative negligence from a corrective justice standpoint.
III. COMPENSATION

Unquestionably, comparative negligence is superior to contributory
negligence in achieving tort law's compensation goal. Comparative

45.

Schwartz, supra note 40, at 727.
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negligence allows injured victims to receive compensation in cases where
contributory negligence would deny such compensation. In any case where
an injured plaintiff is at all negligent and that negligence is a cause of his
injury, the plaintiff can receive compensation from a negligent defendant
also causing the plaintiff's injury under comparative, but not contributory,
negligence. On the other hand, there is no case in which contributory
negligence would afford compensation to an injured victim who would be
denied compensation by comparative negligence.
Similarly, pure comparative negligence is superior to modified
comparative negligence in achieving tort law's compensation goal. Pure
comparative negligence allows injured victims to receive compensation in
cases where modified comparative negligence would deny such
compensation. In any case an injured plaintiff is 51% or more negligent
(50% or more in some jurisdictions) and that negligence is a cause of his
injury, the plaintiff can receive compensation from a negligent defendant
also causing the plaintiff's injury under pure comparative, but not modified
comparative, negligence. On the other hand, there is no case in which
modified comparative negligence would afford compensation to an injured
victim who would be denied compensation by pure comparative
negligence. Thus, pure comparative negligence is superior to modified
comparative negligence from a compensation standpoint.
IV. DETERRENCE

In the last several decades, law and economics scholars have debated
the relative efficiency of contributory and comparative negligence rules in
producing optimal behavior. Deterring accidents is the most important
factor in this analysis. The initial orthodox view was that contributory
negligence was efficient, but comparative negligence was not. Law and
economics scholars relied on two separate, but related, arguments in
support of this conclusion. First, if liability costs are divided, neither party
may have a sufficiently strong incentive to take precautionary measures.
This results in increased accidents. Second, if liability costs are divided,
both parties may take duplicative precautionary measures. Although
accidents may be averted, they could have been prevented in a more
efficient manner.
In 1970, in his seminal work The Costs of Accidents, Professor Guido
Calabresi offered an example of how the division of liability costs can
result in inefficient precautionary incentives. 46 Professor Calabresi

46.
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assumed an accident involving two activities cost $80 each time it
occurred. He further assumed that the accident could be prevented by a
$60 safety device. If either party bore the entire cost of the accident, that
party would install the $60 device and prevent the accident. However, if
liability costs were divided, neither party would spend over $40 to avoid
the accident. Professor Calabresi concluded such a division would result,
in the absence of bargaining between the parties, in neither party taking the
necessary precautionary measure, thus increasing accidents.
Professor Richard A. Posner presented the other alleged inefficiency
of comparative negligence. In his groundbreaking Economic Analysis of
Law, Professor Posner posited a $1,000 accident that could be prevented by
4
the defendant at a cost of $50 and by the plaintiff at a cost of $100. 1
Professor Posner argued that if either party bore the entire cost of liability,
that party would pay to prevent the accident. However, if liability costs
were divided between the two parties, both of them would invest the money
to prevent the accident, resulting in a $100 inefficiency. Professor Posner
also acknowledged the possibility that neither party would make the
investment:
or they might invest nothing (either party, knowing that the
other party had an incentive to prevent the accident, might,
in reliance thereon, make no attempt to prevent it himself),
resulting in an avoidable cost of $950.48
The informal analyses by Professors Calabresi and Posner were
supported by a formal economic analysis in 1973. The first scholar to
formally compare the efficiency of contributory and comparative
negligence, Professor John Prather Brown, also concluded that contributory
negligence was efficient but comparative negligence was not. 49 In a more
recent article focusing on products liability, Professor George L. Priest
argued that the trend from contributory to comparative negligence reduced
tort law's deterrent effect.5 °

ANALYSIS
47.

158 (1970).

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 124 (2d ed. 1977).
Professor Posner's treatment of contributory and comparative negligence herein is an
extension of his analysis in Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD.
29, 39-40 (1972).
48.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFTHE LAW 124 (2d ed. 1977).
49.
John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973).
50.
George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and its Reform, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, II
(1987).
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In the mid-1980's, the efficiency of comparative negligence began to
gain support among law and economics scholars. In 1986, Professors
Robert D. Cooter and Thomas S. Ulen argued that Professor Brown's
conception of comparative negligence was flawed and it caused him to
erroneously conclude that comparative negligence was always inefficient. 5'
Professors Cooter and Ulen argued that, in the absence of perfect
information regarding the legal standard of care and the amount of
precaution that each person takes, parties tend to exceed the legal standard
52
of care in order to allow courts a margin for error in determining fault.
This tendency is accentuated in instances where one party will bear the
entire cost of liability. Because the comparative negligence rule gives
moderate incentives for precaution to both injurers and victims, the rule
minimizes the total amount of excessive precaution when the parties are
"symmetrically situated," i.e., when efficiency requires both parties to take
similar amounts of precaution.53 Thus, the authors concluded that, in
certain circumstances, comparative negligence can be efficient.
In a 1991 article, Professor Daniel Orr argued that the view
contributory negligence was more efficient in optimizing behavior was
based on the assumption that unilaterally taken precautions are fully
effective, a proposition he disputes.54 Professor Orr argued that the use of
game theory demonstrates that a move from contributory to comparative
negligence has two beneficial effects: it strengthens the incentives for
precaution and diminishes the likelihood of excess expenditure thereon.55
In other words, Professor Orr argued that the original orthodox law and
economics view concerning contributory and comparative negligence was
exactly backwards. By 1986, Professor Posner had altered his view of
contributory and comparative negligence. In the third edition of Economic
Analysis of Law, he states, "comparative negligence has the same effects
on safety as contributory negligence. ,,56
A recent survey of legal and economic scholars revealed that scholarly
opinion on the deterrent effect of contributory versus comparative
negligence is divided. In taking a survey of scholarly opinion, Professors
John C. Moorhouse, Andrew P. Morriss, and Robert Whaples asked legal

51.
Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative
Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1067, 1079-80 (1986).

52.
53.

Id. at 1086-87.
Id. at 1090-92.

54.
Daniel Orr, The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1991).
55.
Id.at 120.
56.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 156 (3d ed. 1986).
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and economic scholars to evaluate a series of statements.57 One of the
statements was, "Contributory negligence is more efficient at producing
optimal behavior than comparative negligence". Scholars were asked to
rate their opinion on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly
agree. Thirty-nine percent of respondents disagreed with the statement,
while 25% of respondents agreed with it, and 37% of respondents were
neutral.58 Thus, there does not appear to be a scholarly consensus on the
deterrent effect of one rule versus the other.
One striking aspect of the theoretical debate is the lack of empirical
data marshaled as evidence to support the positions. The occasional
attempt to use empirical data does so to test a previously-constructed
theoretical model of incentives.59 In this article, we make no attempt to
join this theoretical debate. Instead, we focus on empirical data from
jurisdictions applying the various rules. 60 As stated above, according to the
deterrence rationale, tort law is designed to prevent accidents by
threatening potential wrongdoers with civil liability or the inability to
recover. If negligence rules shape the behavior of potential tortfeasors and
if one negligence rule is assumed to have a greater deterrent effect, then
citizens of jurisdictions applying that rule should have lower accident rates
than citizens of jurisdictions adopting the other rule. The issue is whether
contributory or comparative negligence is more successful in achieving tort
law's deterrence rationale of preventing accidents. It will be shown below
that in the case of automobile accidents, 6 ' there is no difference between

57.
John C. Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of
Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667 (1998).
58.
Id. at 675.
59.
See Michelle J. White, An Empirical Test of the Comparativeand Contributory
Negligence Rules in Accident Law, 20 RAND. J. ECON. 308 (1989) (concluding that
contributory negligence provides superior incentives to exercise caution than comparative
negligence).
60.
Although economic arguments are often premised on the assumption of perfect
information, we argue that it is more important to examine these doctrines as they actually
function, with imperfect knowledge. The assumption of perfect information makes it easier
to apply theory to forecast consumer behavior. By using statistical analyses to discover
patterns in actual consumer behavior, we are freed from any reliance on these simplifying
assumptions. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 379 n.9 (1994) ("Yet what does it mean to
say that legal rules 'create incentives' for efficient conduct if there is no evidence that they
in fact bring that conduct about?").
61.
We used automobile accidents because, unlike other categories of torts, figures
indicative of automobile accident rates are available. Additionally, automobile accidents
constitute the largest and most costly category of tort, see DEWEES ET AL., supra note 31, at
15, and, unlike some significant categories of torts such as medical malpractice, the issue of
contributory versus comparative negligence is widely relevant thereto.
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the two rules that would indicate either has a greater deterrent effect than
the other.
To analyze any potential deterrent effect of one rule versus another,
we used data collected by the Insurance Research Council (IRC) in a
compilation called Trends in Auto Injury Claims, 2000 Edition.6

This

compilation provides data for annual bodily injury claims, frequencies and
property damage claims frequencies for the years 1980 through 1998.63 It
is assumed that these claims' rates reflect the risk-taking behavior of each
jurisdiction's citizens and that any differences in the deterrent effects of
contributory and comparative negligence rules would be reflected in the
claims' frequencies. 64 Automobile accident claims' frequencies for bodily
injury and property damage were used as indicators of the underlying
behavior of each jurisdiction's population.
Only four states and the District of Columbia, all of which currently
have the contributory negligence rule, adhered to that rule in 1998, the
most recent year for which data were available. Because of this small
sample size relative to the number of comparative negligence jurisdictions,
we decided to look at statistics from 1980 as well. Although the pool of
contributory negligence jurisdictions has been shrinking through the years,
by looking back to 1980 we were able to increase the sample size to
fourteen.65 The jurisdictions assigned to the contributory group negligence
group are listed in the table below. 66

The data is prepared by and subject to the copyright of the Insurance Research
62.
Council, 718 Providence Rd., Malvern, Pennsylvania 19355-0725, phone (610) 644-2212
x7569.
We would have preferred to use accident rate statistics rather than claims
63.
frequencies; however, accident rates are not compiled consistently from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and we could not find a valid database containing such statistics. Our analyses
and conclusions rely on the assumption that the claims' frequencies reported for each
jurisdiction are directly proportional to that jurisdiction's accident rates.
64.
Claims frequency is the number of claims per 100 insured vehicles. We
recognize that the claims frequency rates necessarily do not include uninsured motorists.
However, because the figures are based on the number of insured cars and not the general
population, we believe this is not a significant factor.
65.
In statistics, sample refers to the group from which the data was obtained (e.g.,
insured vehicles in contributory negligence states in 1980); population refers to the larger
group from which the sample was taken (e.g., insured vehicles in all contributory negligence
states at any given point in time).GEOFFREY KEPPEL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO DESIGN AND
ANALYSIS 17 (2d ed. 1992).

66.
Of the 51 jurisdictions, only 47 were analyzed. No data was available for New
Hampshire. South Dakota and Michigan were omitted because of their unique rules during
one or both of the years in question. We did not analyze their rules separately because one
state is too small a sample size to generate a meaningful analysis. Tennessee, in 1992,
modified comparative negligence by replacing a rule called remote contributory negligence,
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Table 1--Contributory Negligence Jurisdictions
Year
Changed to
Comparative
Number
Jurisdictions
Negligence
1
New Mexico
1981
2
Illinois
1981
3
Iowa
1982
4
Missouri
1983
5
Indiana
1983
6
Kentucky
1984
7
Arizona
1984
8
Delaware
1984
9
South Carolina
1991
10
Alabama*
N/A
11
District of Columbia*
N/A
12
Virginia*
N/A
13
North Carolina*
N/A
14
Maryland*
N/A
*Current contributory negligence jurisdictions
The table below provides descriptive statistics for each sample:
sample 1 (CONTRIB), composed of the contributory negligence
jurisdictions; and sample 2 (COMPAR), composed of the comparative
negligence jurisdictions.
The numbers presented are claims per 100
insured vehicles. CF_BI is claims frequency for bodily injury and CFPD
is claims frequency for property damage.

which focused on causation and apparently determined whether a plaintiffs contribution to
the injury was remote. Because Tennessee's rule was not the standard contributory
negligence rule, Tennessee was not included in our analyses. All other states were included
in the comparative negligence group in the analyses.
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Table 2-Data Analysis
Number of
Jurisdictions
Group
Used
Mean Claims Freg
1998

CF BI
CF PD
1980

CFBI
CFPD

CONTRIB
COMPAR
CONTRIB
COMPAR

5
42
5
42

1.3328
1.0576
4.2580
3.9760

CONTRIB
COMPAR
CONTRIB

14
33
14

0.9180
0.7453
4.6260

33

4.6832

_COMPAR

We cannot determine anything conclusive about the relationship
between the contributory and comparative negligence jurisdictions simply
by comparing raw data obtained from a few samples. What we want to do
instead is use inferential statistical procedures to show that the samples are
representative of the populations involved, and that any differences
between the samples can or cannot be extrapolated to actual population
differences. 67 The hypothesis tested can be based on prior observations or
on a theory, and the sample observations are used to determine the
likelihood that a particular hypothesis is true.68
The method relies on the construction of two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive hypotheses. One is called the null hypothesis, H0, and the other
is the alternative hypothesis, designated H1 . The null hypothesis is that

67.
Statistical tests compare samples to see if they are taken from the same or from
different populations; that is, if they share the same characteristics relevant to the issue
under consideration. KEPPEL, ET AL., supra note 65, at 17. In this case, one of the samples is
insured vehicles in comparative negligence states in 1998. Our parameters are claims
frequencies for bodily injury and property damage, which we infer are related to driving
habits. We want to know if the two samples come from the same general population of
"insured vehicles" or if a distinction can be drawn between two separate populations with
different driving habits: those in contributory negligence jurisdictions and those in
comparative negligence jurisdictions.
Inferential statistics allow us to do so by
compensating for, inter alia, the difference in sample size. G. KEPPEL & S. ZEDECK, DATA
ANALYSIS FOR RESEARCH DESIGNS (1989), at 546-547.
68.
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there is no difference between groups on the chosen parameters, while the
alternative hypothesis is that a difference does exist. 69 Inferential statistics
will tell us if a significant difference exists between the samples, where
"significant" means that it can be concluded that they come from different
populations.7 °
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we believe that either
the contributory negligence rule or the comparative negligence rule has a
superior deterrence effect on insured drivers. Our alternative hypothesis
(HI), then, is that a statistically significant difference exists between mean
claims frequencies in contributory and comparative negligence
jurisdictions. Our null hypothesis (Ho) is that no difference exists.
We looked at several statistical tests commonly used to test
hypotheses of this type and selected a nonparametric 7 1 test called the
Mann-Whitney U test. 72 This test accomplishes all that other tests could
with this data set, and is the simplest both to use and understand. 73
Statistical tests analyze the data sets and calculate numbers that are
used to determine the significance level of any differences between the raw
data sets. The significance level indicates how likely it is that any
differences are due to chance versus the examined variable (in our case, the
type of negligence rule involved). Generally, the null hypothesis, that no
difference exists between the samples, is rejected if there is less than a five
percent likelihood, or p<0.05, that the difference is only due to chance, and
a 95% degree74 of certainty that the difference between populations does
reliably exist.

69.
KEPPEL, ET AL., supra note 65, at 70.
70.
KEPPEL, ET AL., supra note 65, at Il1l.
71.
A parametric statistical test is a test that relies upon certain assumptions about
the parameters from which the research sample. was drawn. SYDNEY SIEGEL,
NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 30-31 (1956).
72.
We considered using several parametric tests including the independent
samples t test. However, the t test assumes that the test variables are normally distributed
(as in a bell curve) in each of the two populations. KEPPEL, ET AL., supra note 65, at I l1.
We tested the normality assumption for each of the sample populations and found that one
sample population was substantially nonnormal. Thus, the t test could not be used and we
were forced to rely on nonparametric tests of hypotheses.
73.
For a more complete explanation of the Mann-Whitney U Test and the Z
statistic, see the Appendix.
74.
KEPPEL, ET AL., supra note 65, at 113. This standard is adopted because chance
can always produce the difference we seek to prove. For example, if one was seeking to
prove a vitamin supplement increased height in children, one could inadvertently select as a
sample a group of children that was going to be taller than their peers with or without the
supplement. Thus, the statistical test might give us a 95% degree of certainty even if the
hypothesis was incorrect. The experiment can be replicated and new data sets tested to
confirm there is still a 95% degree of certainty a difference exists, or the null hypothesis
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For the 1998 bodily injury claims data, we found that the likelihood
that any difference between the samples is due to chance is more than
20%.75 For the 1998 property damage data, this likelihood is more than
80%.76 Therefore, for the 1998 data, we were unable to find any statistical
evidence of a difference in mean claims frequencies for either bodily injury
or property damage.
We next performed the Mann-Whitney U test on the 1980 data. For
the bodily injury claims frequencies, the likelihood that any difference
between the samples is due to chance is more than 5%.77 For the property
damage claims frequencies, we found that the likelihood that any difference
between the samples is due to chance is 69%.78
In summary, we have conducted statistical tests to find evidence of a
superior deterrent effect attributable to one negligence rule as compared to
the other. We compared claims frequencies data from contributory and
comparative jurisdictions, using two years, 1980 and 1998. There is no
evidence of any differences between the two groups in either year. We
therefore conclude that any deterrent effect caused by a contributory
negligence rule is no different than that created by a comparative rule.79
V. CONCLUSION

In the jurisdictions in the United States there are multiple rules
regarding contributory and comparative negligence. To determine which
rule is superior, it is necessary to determine what tort law is attempting to

could fail to be disproved. In the latter case, the suspicion arises that the initial difference
between data sets may have been due to chance. Because chance can produce this
difference, one can never conclude with 100% certainty that the samples come from
different populations.
75.
Z=-1.242, p=0.228. We used SPSS for Windows, Release 10 to calculate the
statistics used in these tests.
Z=-0.224, p=0.828.
76.
77.

Z=-1.955, p=0.05I.

78.
Z=-0.396, p=0.692.
79.
Although we are not aware of any scholars that argue there is a superior
deterrent effect between modified and pure comparative negligence, we analyzed the 1998
bodily injury claim frequencies for modified and pure comparative negligence states using
two non-parametric tests. Both tests indicated that there is no statistical evidence supporting
the claim of a superior deterrent effect for either rule. The statistical distributions of the
claims frequencies for the rules are so close that they cannot be distinguished with these
sample sizes. We did not separately analyze the rules in effect in South Dakota or Michigan
because one state is too small a sample size to generate a meaningful analysis.
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accomplish. There are three principal rationales for the tort system:
corrective justice, compensation and deterrence.
Pure comparative negligence is the rule that best achieves the goals of
tort law. Pure comparative negligence is superior from a corrective justice
perspective because it requires tortfeasors to correct their wrongs in all
cases. Modified comparative negligence and, especially, contributory
negligence relieve tortfeasors of the burden of correcting their wrongs.
Pure comparative negligence is superior from a compensation perspective
because it affords compensation to the most injured victims. Modified
comparative negligence and, especially, contributory negligence deny
compensation to injured victims. Finally, the deterrence rationale does not
appear to favor either the contributory or comparative negligence rule. 80
Contrary to the claims of some law and economics scholars, contributory
negligence does not appear to deter accidents any more than does
comparative negligence. Therefore, pure comparative negligence is the
superior rule.8'
APPENDIX

The Mann-Whitney U test was selected for this study because it was
determined that we needed a nonparametric statistical test. A parametric
test, such as a t test, relies on certain assumptions about the data sets
involved, such as that they are normally distributed. A normal distribution,
when graphed, forms a regular bell curve, with most of the data points
falling in the middle and fewer and fewer toward the extremes.82 In our
case, one sample population was not normally distributed; thus, we had to
use a nonparametric test.

80.
These analyses do not support, and we are not making, the claim that tort law
does not deter accidents. Whether tort law deters automobile accidents is beyond the scope
of this article. We do find, however, that there is no significant difference in the level of
deterrence caused by contributory versus comparative negligence. Some law and economics
scholars argue that, under certain assumptions, every form of the negligence rule gives the
tortfeasor and the victim incentives for efficient precaution. See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER &
THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMics 310 (2000). It is possible our conclusions support

this argument but that, too, is beyond the scope of this article.
81.
For an article advocating the abolition of comparative, as well as contributory,

negligence, see Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative
Fault, with Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, 1979 U.
ILL. L. FORUM 591.
82.
KEPPEL, ET AL., supra note 65, at 171.
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The Mann-Whitney U test examines the distributions of the data sets
involved in order to determine if they come from the same population or
not. As we can see from the following explanation, it is simple to apply.

The Mann-Whitney U-Test:
Designate the size of the data set in 83the smaller sample as
n, and that of the larger sample as n2.
1. "List the observations from the smallest to the largest in
such a way that the two samples may be easily
compared. 84
2. "For each observation in one sample.. .count the number
of observations in the other sample that are lower in
value .... Count 2 for each tied observation." The sum of
these counts = C. "The Mann-Whitney statistic U, is the
greater of the two quantities C and (n~n 2-C)....85
For the 1980 data, n 1=14 and n 2=33; for the 1998 data, n 1=5 and
n 2=42. By convention, the Z value is derived from the Mann-Whitney U
when n2 > 20, and is used to test the significance of U. 86 The following
formula is used to calculate Z, where 12 is a constant:
n1n2
2

U
Z=

t (nl)(n2)(nl+ n2 + 1)
12
87

Once the Z value is determined, a significance value (p) is assigned
using a table.88
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84.
PRACTICE OF STATISTICS IN BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 433-4 (2d ed. 1981).
85.
SOKAL & ROHLF, see supra note 81, at 433-4.
SIEGEL, see supra note 81, at 120-1.
86.
SIEGEL, see supra note 81, at 121.
87.
SIEGEL, see supra note 81, at 12 1.
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